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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many differences between international arbitration and 
US litigation.1 One especially important, but often overlooked, 
difference is the rate of settlement. Litigation cases in the state and 
federal courts of the United States are very likely to end in settlement. 
International arbitration cases are not. Such cases are far more likely 
to proceed to trial (i.e., a full evidentiary hearing on the merits) than 
are cases in US litigation.2 
                                                                                                             
* Alexandre de Gramont is a partner in the International Arbitration Group at Dechert 
LLP and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. Michael D. 
Igyarto and Tatiana Sainati are associates in the International Arbitration Group of Dechert 
LLP. Mr. de Gramont and Ms. Sainati are resident in Dechert’s Washington, D.C. office and 
Mr. Igyarto is resident in Dechert’s New York office. The authors express their gratitude to 
paralegal Madeline Tutman for her assistance in preparing this Article. 
1. The term “US” litigation,” as used in this article, refers to litigation in both the state 
and federal courts of the United States. 
2. A separate reason why international arbitration cases tend to proceed to trial at a 
higher rate than US litigation cases is that US litigation cases are more often resolved by 
dispositive motions. Resolution of cases by dispositive motions in international arbitration 
remains comparatively infrequent. See generally Adam Raviv, No More Excuses: Toward a 
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The statistics, even if imperfect, are striking. Most analyses of 
US cases put the settlement rate in the range of seventy to ninety 
percent.3 Even when limited to contract/commercial cases, settlement 
rates in US litigation are typically estimated at well over sixty 
percent.4 International arbitration cases, on the other hand, settle at a 
far lower rate, with most studies estimating the settlement rate at 
thirty to forty percent.5 
Cases in US litigation settle at a higher rate than cases in 
international arbitration for a variety of reasons. Litigation in the state 
and federal courts of the United States is notoriously expensive, time-
consuming, and disruptive, with far-reaching and intrusive discovery. 
Moreover, the uneven quality of lay juries (and sometimes judges) 
contributes to unpredictable results. Many litigants thus prefer to 
settle their disputes rather than face the time, expense, and uncertainty 
inherent in litigating a case through trial in US courts. 
Another reason for the higher settlement rate in US litigation is 
the fact that many US judges actively promote settlement. Many 
judges no doubt promote settlement because they genuinely believe 
that parties are usually better off resolving their disputes through 
amicable resolution than protracted, costly, and unpredictable 
litigation. But judges may also promote settlement as a means to 
manage their increasingly large dockets, which in many judicial 
                                                                                                             
Workable System of Dispositive Motions in International Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 487 
(2012). 
3. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009). Given the numerous 
different court systems in the United States, and the fact that it is not always easy to determine 
whether a case has settled through a review of the case file, there has been debate and 
uncertainty concerning the settlement rate for US litigation. However, nearly all of the 
analyses conclude that the vast majority of US litigation cases end in settlement. See id. 
4. Id. at 120. 
5. See, e.g., Yaraslau Kryvoi & Dmitry Davydenko, Consent Awards in International 
Arbitration: From Settlement to Enforcement, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827, 828-29 (2015); 
Loukas Mistelis, Special Section on the 2008 Survey on Corporate Attitudes Towards 
Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: The Settlement-Enforcement 
Dynamic in International Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 377, 378 (2008). As with 
estimating the settlement rate in US litigation, estimating the settlement rate in international 
arbitration presents certain challenges. There are numerous different international arbitration 
institutions, which do not necessarily keep or make public records indicating settlement rates. 
There are also numerous ad hoc arbitrations that are not administered by any institution. 
Therefore, the analyses of settlement rates in international arbitration are generally based on 
surveys of the users of international arbitration services rather than institutional records. 
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districts have become overwhelming. Indeed, the culture of settlement 
promotion in much of the US judiciary is so pervasive that 
“settlement is the modal civil case outcome” in US litigation.6 
By contrast, many international arbitrators are reluctant to 
promote or even mention settlement, lest they be perceived as biased 
or as prejudging the case.7 US and other common law lawyers who sit 
as arbitrators in particular see their role as limited to adjudicating the 
dispute.8 In their view, the promotion of settlement is a role limited to 
mediators.9 
Some commentators have observed that arbitrators who come 
from legal traditions where part of the court’s mission is to seek 
settlement (such as the Romano-Germanic tradition) are far more 
open to discussing and even facilitating settlement in arbitration 
cases.10 Yet despite the now prevalent efforts by US judges to 
promote settlement, US lawyers who sit as arbitrators in international 
arbitration remain largely reluctant or unwilling to intervene to 
encourage settlement.11 
The differences in settlement rates between US litigation and 
international arbitration have real and practical consequences for 
parties who have a choice of how to resolve their disputes; so too, 
does the difference between how US judges and international 
arbitrators approach the issue of settlement. There are certainly sound 
reasons why users of international arbitration may not want arbitrators 
to be as proactive (or, some might say, aggressive) as US judges in 
                                                                                                             
6. Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 3, at 112. 
7. Kun Fan, The Risks of Apparent Bias When an Arbitrator Acts as a Mediator: 
Remarks on Hong Kong Court’s Decision in Gao Haiyan, 13 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 535, 538 
(2011). 
8. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: 
Towards a Transnational Standard, 25 ARB. INT’L 187, 190 (2009). 
9. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and 
Settlement: Empirical Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. 
MEDIATION 1, 1 (2014) (“It is generally understood that arbitrators adjudicate disputes and 
mediators help settle them through negotiated agreement.”) (citing John W. Cooley, 
Arbitration v. Mediation – Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263 (1986)). 
10. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Victor Bonnin, Arbitrators as Conciliators: A 
Statistical Study of the Relationship between an Arbitrator’s Role and Legal Background, 
18(2) INT’L CHAMBER COM. BULL. 1, 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/4/92368195274054/media01231914460597000950003.pdf. 
11. Id. (“Practitioners know from experience that German arbitrators and arbitrators from 
German-speaking Switzerland will be more likely to intervene to encourage a settlement than 
their English or American counterparts.”). 
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urging settlement. Arbitrators are paid to devote their attention to 
adjudicating the dispute in a manner that results in a thorough and 
reasoned outcome that is fair (if not necessarily favorable) to both 
parties. One reason parties choose arbitration is to have greater 
control over the proceedings, which in turn may lead many arbitrators 
to take a “hands-off” approach when it comes to promoting 
settlement. Many arbitrators may rightly believe that the parties, 
having chosen arbitration, are perfectly capable of engaging in 
settlement discussions without the arbitrator’s encouragement or 
intervention. 
On the other hand, as has been widely observed, many users of 
international arbitration are concerned and dissatisfied with its rising 
costs, increased delays, and perceived inefficiencies.12 The role of 
arbitrators in promoting settlement is therefore “intertwined with 
concerns regarding efficiency and economy in arbitration, which in 
recent years has been the subject of continuing attention and 
discussion.”13 If international arbitration is seen to be as costly and 
time-consuming as litigation—with less likelihood of settlement 
because arbitrators are unwilling to encourage it—that may well 
result in fewer parties choosing international arbitration to resolve 
their disputes.14 Many users of international arbitration may in fact 
want arbitrators to play a role in encouraging the parties to settle. 
This Article first reviews the rise in settlement efforts among US 
judges over the past few decades and considers some of the methods 
deployed by US judges to promote settlement.15 The Article then 
considers why international arbitration cases tend to settle less often 
than US litigation cases, including the reasons why many arbitrators 
are reluctant to promote settlement. While recognizing the reasons 
that arbitrators cannot become as proactive in promoting settlement as 
many US judges, the Article suggests steps that arbitrators might take 
to encourage settlement without departing from their obligation to 
                                                                                                             
12. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 191. 
13. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 5. 
14. Of course, some parties may not have any choice other than to agree to international 
arbitration or face litigation in the foreign courts of their counterparty. But many parties are 
able to negotiate forum resolution clauses in their cross-border contracts that provide for US 
litigation and have no reason to be concerned about enforcing a US judgment against their 
foreign counter-party. 
15. See infra Section II. 
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remain neutral and impartial, and to provide parties with the dispute 
resolution services that they want.16 The Article concludes that while 
it is neither feasible nor desirable for international arbitrators to 
engage in settlement activities to the same extent as US judges, there 
are steps that international arbitrators can and should take to promote 
settlement in international arbitration cases.17 
II. THE PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT IN AMERICAN COURTS 
The role of US judges in facilitating and promoting settlement 
has received much attention over the past few decades.18 The use of 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) techniques currently employed 
in US courts varies widely, even within the same courthouse. Prior to 
1983, there was no explicit authority for US judges to participate in 
settlement of their cases. Since then, Congress has enacted several 
laws that explicitly authorize settlement participation by the judiciary. 
Indeed, not only are US judges encouraged (and sometimes required) 
to take a more active role in promoting settlement, there are 
remarkably few limitations on their authority to do so. As a result, US 
judges now employ a wide variety of ADR techniques, which the 
courts have almost always approved when challenged. This section 
will discuss first the current legislative framework regarding the 
participation of US judges in settlement, and will then describe 
several of the various techniques used in US courts to promote and 
facilitate settlement. 
A. The Evolution of US Judicial Involvement in Settlement of 
Disputes 
Common law courts, like those in the United States, have 
traditionally “been entrusted with adjudicating, not settling, 
disputes.”19 The original version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                                                                                             
16. See infra Section III. 
17. See infra Section IV. 
18. Although our focus in this section is primarily on federal rules and practice, many 
state courts throughout the United States have adopted similar rules and practices. “[E]very 
state now has some type of court-connected ADR at some level.” Comparing State Courts, 
NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Comparing-state-
courts.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
19. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 190. 
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16, for example, “which provided that a court could hold a 
discretionary pretrial conference, said nothing about settlement in its 
list of subjects for consideration.”20 
In the early 1980s, however, influential commentators like 
Professor Judith Resnik “helped launch a debate in the United States 
about judicial management and managerial judges that stemmed 
primarily from frustrations over the costs, delays and formalism of 
adjudication.”21 As a result, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 was 
amended in 1983 specifically to permit some judicial involvement in 
the settlement process:  
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys 
for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it 
for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as 
. . . facilitating the settlement of the case.22 
The Advisory Committee observed that the reasons for promoting and 
facilitating settlement include saving costs for litigants and the 
judicial system and reducing crowded court dockets:  
 [The 1983 amendment] recognizes that it has become 
commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since 
it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to 
the litigants and the judicial system, settlement should be 
facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible.23 
In the 1990s, Congress continued its support for the expansion of 
ADR in the federal judiciary through the passage of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act, which “requires the courts to utilize ADR programs to 
reduce litigation costs and to alleviate congestion and delay in the 
court system.”24 As the late US District Judge Harold Baer, Jr. 
observed, “[a] direct result of the [Civil Justice Reform Act] was the 
adoption of some form of ADR in almost all of the ninety-four federal 
district courts.”25 Then in 1998, Congress passed the Alternative 
                                                                                                             
20. Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 242-43 (2002-
2003). 
21. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 191. 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). 
23. Id. (advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendments). 
24. Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediating Their Own 
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 133-34 (2001). 
25. Id. 
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Dispute Resolution Act,26 “which mandates that all federal courts 
implement ADR programs, make improvements to existing programs, 
and appoint judicial officers to supervise ADR procedures in the 
courts.”27 
B. ADR Techniques Used in US Courts 
Despite the consistent encouragement for courts to develop and 
utilize ADR techniques, there is little guidance regarding the 
permissible extent of a judge’s involvement in settlement. The current 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct contains only one provision 
addressing the limits of a judge’s authority in settlement, which states 
(in its entirety) that, “[a] judge may encourage parties to a proceeding 
and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall not act in a 
manner that coerces any party into settlement.”28 However, as at least 
one commentator has noted that the provision, “even as elaborated in 
the comments to Rule 2.6(B), is so elastic and general that it leaves 
individual judges free to conclude that any one of a number of 
extremely different approaches to settlement work is ethically 
permissible.”29 
US courts currently deploy a myriad of ADR procedures to 
promote settlement of disputes.  Many of these procedures involve 
persons other than the judge to help the parties reach settlement. As 
described in one publication, the procedures include: 
Mediation – “Mediation is a relatively informal, non-binding 
process in which a neutral third party attempts to help litigants reach a 
consensual solution to their dispute . . . . Because of its amorphous 
and flexible nature, mediation is considered appropriate for most 
types of civil cases.”30 
Arbitration – “Arbitration differs from mediation in its use of an 
arbitrator to reach a decision as opposed to a consensual judgment 
among the parties . . . . Arbitration is typically useful in contract and 
                                                                                                             
26. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1998). 
27. Baer, supra note 24, at 134 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 651(b)-(d)). 
28. MODEL CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT, r. 2.6(B). 
29. John C. Cratsley, Judges and Settlement: So Little Regulation with So Much at Stake, 
16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4 (2010). 
30. Peter Lantka, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Magistrate 
Judge’s Office: A Glimmering Light Amidst the Haze of Federal Litigation, 36 UWLA L. REV. 
71, 79 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
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tort cases involving moderate amounts of money for which litigation 
costs are disproportionate to the amount at stake.”31 
Hybrid Mediation-Arbitration (“Med-Arb”) – “Med-Arb is a 
rarely utilized process in which parties first attempt to settle their case 
through mediation and go directly to arbitration if the process is 
unsuccessful . . . . however, [Med-Arb] is usually tempered by the 
fact that litigants are tempted to hold back information during 
mediation for fear that it will be used against them at a later date.”32 
Early Neutral Evaluation (“ENE”) – “Early Neutral Evaluation 
allows parties to present their preliminary case to a neutral evaluator. 
The process involves an initial exchange of briefs followed by an 
ENE session in which each party presents its case to the evaluator, 
calling witnesses and presenting evidence if necessary. The session is 
concluded with a non-binding written evaluation from the evaluator 
assessing the merits of each party’s case and estimating possible 
awards.”33 
Summary Trial – “The summary trial, as its name implies, is a 
truncated version of an actual trial. The process includes attorney 
presentations to the judge, magistrate, or jury and an eventual non-
binding decision.”34 
Mini-trial – Although rarely used, “[t]he mini-trial is a 
specialized form of ADR designed to handle large, commercial 
litigation cases. Generally, the mini-trial consists of high-level, high-
profile executives meeting with a neutral third party. Unlike a 
summary trial, the neutral party does not make a decision. Rather, the 
‘trial’ consists of information being presented to the respective 
executives who retire afterwards and attempt to reach a mutual 
settlement.”35 
Another report notes the use of a “practice jury,” where the 
judge seeks volunteers from the jury pool (those in the courthouse for 
jury duty that were not selected for an actual case) and then allows 
counsel to make a presentation about the issues of the case and the 
                                                                                                             
31. Id. at 79-80. 
32. Id. at 80. 
33. Id. at 80-81. 
34. Id. at 81. 
35. Id. at 82. 
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evidence likely to be introduced. Once both sides have presented, the 
attorneys can then ask questions of the practice jury.36 
The extent to which US judges will themselves become involved 
in an ADR procedure—and then remain to adjudicate the case if it 
does not settle—varies considerably. Some judges, for example, will 
not adjudicate a case on the merits if they have previously 
participated in an unsuccessful form of ADR. Some judges routinely 
have Magistrate Judges37 handle settlement conferences and ADR 
processes to avoid any appearance of bias should the settlement 
efforts fail. Other judges, however, will participate in the ADR 
process and also adjudicate the dispute if settlement efforts fail.38 
Beyond those differences, some judges will meet separately with the 
parties (while others will only address all parties together), while 
others will separate clients from attorneys for individual 
discussions.39 
Judge John C. Crastley served on the Massachusetts Superior 
Court for nearly a quarter of a century and served as Chair of the 
Superior Court Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution. In an 
illuminating article, Judge Crastley interviewed three of his 
colleagues on the Massachusetts Superior Court “who are well known 
for their work as settlement judges” and then recounted their various 
approaches to settlement.40 
As the article describes, “Judge A” routinely has an introductory 
conference with all counsel and parties, and then asks everyone to 
leave except for the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.41 Judge A 
then asks the defense team how much money is available to settle.42 
Judge A then meets with the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s counsel to ask 
                                                                                                             
36. Cratsley, supra note 29, at 6. 
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a) (2010) (providing authorization for US federal magistrate judges 
as judicial officers in the district court system). A US magistrate judge exercises jurisdiction 
over matters assigned by statute, as well as those delegated by the district judges, although 
duties assigned to magistrate judges by district court judges may vary considerably from court 
to court. Unlike District Court judges (who enjoy tenure for life), a full-time magistrate judge 
is appointed by majority vote of the active district judges of the court and serves a term of 
eight years. Id.  
38. Cratsley, supra note 29, at 4-6. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 4. 
41. Id. at 5. 
42. Id. 
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what amount they need to settle.43 Once he has a feeling for the 
plaintiff’s position, Judge A asks only the plaintiff’s counsel whether 
the case would settle if he could get a number near what he got from 
the defense side, although counsel is directed not to share that number 
with the plaintiff.44 Judge A then goes back to the defense side and 
asks if they could settle for an amount higher than they initially 
indicated if it would terminate the case.45 If the defense side agrees to 
a higher (and usually final) number, he then meets privately with the 
plaintiff’s counsel, instructs counsel that this is the best offer he can 
get and asks counsel to recommend the number to the plaintiff and 
explain how it was reached.46 Even if the plaintiff comes back with a 
higher number, Judge A does not engage in further back-and-forth at 
that point.47 
“Judge B” takes a substantially different approach and never 
separates the parties from either their counsel or the other parties.48 
Instead, he inquires about the current state of settlement discussions 
and offers or demands.49 He then comments on the realism of the 
offers and demands, the prospects of the plaintiff prevailing and the 
strengths of the pleaded defenses.50 If Judge B determines that the 
lawyers are comfortable with achievable settlement terms but there is 
a client hold-out, he then discusses with all parties the risks of trial, 
the uncertainty of a jury decision, his views on the strength of 
available evidence, and jury awards in similar trials.51 
“Judge C” uses a more standard form of judicial mediation, in 
which he meets with all parties and counsel, then engages in so-called 
“shuttle diplomacy,” meeting with one side (and its counsel), then the 
other side, trying to close the gap between the parties.52 Over the 
course of several iterations, Judge C may suggest that the parties 
“split the difference”; that the party with greater assets or exposure 
should come up by more than half the difference; that the parties 
                                                                                                             
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 5-6. 
52.  Id. at 6. 
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agree to some form of non-monetary settlement; or that the parties 
accept what Judge C believes to be the “best” possible settlement.53 If 
Judge C is ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the case though, he 
will then inform the parties that he will not be the trial judge.54 
Some American courts even set up special systems to help 
facilitate settlements. As retired US Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow 
describes, some federal courts in Illinois have had their “Magistrate 
Judges create[] and maintain a settlement database of cases that 
appeared with frequency, such as employment discrimination, civil 
rights, personal injury, and consumer credit.”55 Judge Denlow 
explains: 
By tracking the major characteristics of a settlement, including 
the settlement terms, the plaintiff’s initial demand, the 
defendant’s initial offer, the plaintiff’s itemization of damages, 
the stage of the litigation, and brief comments from the judge, we 
were able to help parties determine whether the settlement 
proposals being made were consistent with other similar cases. 
Because of the large volume of cases, we were able to provide 
useful guidance to the parties on the appropriate settlement 
range.56 
The same court “also developed a settlement assistance program, 
in which volunteer lawyers were appointed to represent pro se 
litigants for the sole purpose of representing them in a settlement 
conference.” Judge Denlow reports that the program “has further 
reduced the amount of motions and trials in pro se cases.”57 
Finally, some US judges use “signaling” as means to encourage 
settlement. Signaling can occur orally (for example, commenting at a 
pre-trial conference that a claim or defense may appear 
unsubstantiated) or in writing while denying dispositive motions (e.g., 
“while I cannot say I think highly of plaintiff’s case, there may be 
some issue of fact that precludes summary judgment”).58 Signaling 
                                                                                                             
53.  Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Morton Denlow, Magistrate Judges’ Important Role in Settling Cases, 2014 FED. 
LAW. 101, 103 (2014). 
56. Id. 
57.  Id. at 102. 
58.  Brunet, supra note 20, at 232-33.  
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often encourages the parties (or at least one party) to consider 
settlement seriously.59 
III. THE PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
There are good and legitimate reasons why the settlement rate in 
international arbitration is lower than that in US litigation. As 
explained above, parties to US litigation often decide to settle in order 
to avoid the uncertainty of jury verdicts. That may be especially true 
in complex or highly technical cases. By contrast, parties typically 
choose international arbitrators who, by virtue of their background 
and expertise, are particularly competent to decide the dispute at 
hand. As also explained above, US judges often promote settlement as 
a means to manage and reduce their heavy caseloads. By contrast, 
parties (at least in theory) choose international arbitrators who can 
dedicate themselves to the dispute presented without the competing 
demands of a heavy court docket. In addition, parties to US litigation 
may settle early to avoid having their confidential business 
information (or other secrets) revealed in public proceedings. Because 
parties can typically agree to maintain the confidentiality of 
arbitration proceedings, such publicity concerns are less likely to lead 
the parties to settle in international arbitration. In short, the reasons 
why parties often prefer international arbitration to litigation also 
explain, in part, why the settlement rate is lower in international 
arbitration than in litigation. Overall, parties generally have more 
confidence and fewer concerns in proceeding to a trial by arbitrators 
than a trial by jury to resolve their dispute. 
At the same time, the lower settlement rate in international 
arbitration may also result from entrenched habits and antiquated 
expectations—and perhaps even misconceptions as to what is 
permissible on the part of the arbitrators. Again, given the oft-stated 
concerns about increasingly expensive and protracted international 
arbitration proceedings, there is every reason to consider whether 
international arbitrators should become more active in promoting 
settlement—and if so, how—within the parameters of their ethical 
obligations and their mandate. Indeed, some commentators have 
                                                                                                             
59.  Id. at 250. 
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questioned whether an arbitrator’s “ethical obligations extend to 
helping promote an early resolution of a dispute by means of 
settlement, which is very often the best way of achieving cost-savings 
and efficiency as well as a satisfactory result.”60 
There is no question that many parties to international 
arbitration, as well as many international arbitral institutions, take 
steps to promote the early settlement of disputes before undertaking 
full-blown arbitration proceedings. For example, parties may include 
tiered dispute resolution clauses in their contracts.61 Such clauses may 
require that prior to commencing arbitration, a party must provide the 
counterparty with a notice of the dispute. The parties must then 
undertake efforts to resolve the dispute amicably (perhaps through a 
meeting of their CEOs or other senior officers). If such efforts are 
unsuccessful, the dispute resolution clause might then permit the 
parties to proceed to arbitration—or might require another step such 
as mediation. Often, these clauses require the parties to devote a 
certain amount of time to such efforts before formally commencing 
the arbitration.62 
Similarly, many prominent arbitral institutions provide ADR 
services designed to assist the parties in settling their disputes without 
arbitration—such as mediation and expert determinations.63 The 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) launched an 
“Arb-Med-Arb” protocol in 2015 in collaboration with the recently 
                                                                                                             
60. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 2. 
61. See, e.g., PAUL D. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS 121 (2d ed. 2007). 
62. See id. at 121-23. 
63. For example, the ICC administers both arbitrations and mediations. The institution’s 
Mediation Rules and Arbitration Rules are “designed to facilitate the combination of ICC 
Mediation and ICC Arbitration.” Combination of Arbitration and Mediation Under the ICC 
Rules of Arbitration and ICC Rules of Mediation, INT’L CHAMBER COM., 
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Mediation/Introduction/  
Combination-of-arbitration-and-mediation-under-the-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration-and-ICC-Rules 
 -of-Mediation/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). Similarly, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
offers both arbitration and mediation services. Dispute Resolution Services, ARB. INST. 
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER COM., http://sccinstitute.com/dispute-resolution/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2017). The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution likewise offers 
mediation and arbitration services. Services Offered, INT’L INST. CONFLICT PREVENTION & 
RESOL., https://www.cpradr.org/dispute-resolution-services/services-offered (last visited Jan. 
11, 2017). 
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established Singapore International Mediation Centre.64  If the parties 
elect to participate in the protocol, then, after the exchange of the 
Notice of Arbitration and Response to the Notice of Arbitration, the 
SIAC tribunal refers the dispute to the Mediation Centre and stays 
arbitral proceedings while mediation is attempted. If, within eight 
weeks, mediation proves unsuccessful, arbitral proceedings resume.65 
The harder issue is whether and to what extent international 
arbitrators themselves should promote settlement discussions among 
the parties appearing before them. Arbitration rules and institutions 
provide that arbitrators can at least raise the issue of settlement with 
the parties. For example, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Notes on Organizing 
Arbitral Proceedings of 2016 provide that “[i]n appropriate 
circumstances, the arbitral tribunal may raise the possibility of a 
settlement between the parties.”66 
In addition, there are a number of steps that arbitrators might 
take to promote settlement that do not include directly engaging in 
settlement discussions with the parties. For example, Neil Kaplan, a 
well-known arbitrator and former High Court Judge in Hong Kong, 
has proposed a mechanism—the eponymous Kaplan Opening—that 
uses the inherent flexibility in arbitral proceedings to clarify key 
issues and facts in dispute before the main hearing.67 Mr. Kaplan 
                                                                                                             
64. Gary B. Born, Drafting International Arbitration Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 29-114, ¶ 
24 (5th ed. 2016). 
65. SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol, SINGAPORE INT’L MEDIATION CTR., 
http://simc.com.sg/siac-simc-arb-med-arb-protocol (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
66. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS ¶ 72 
(2016), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-
2016-e.pdf. This provision reflects a changed attitude in favor of settlement. The 1996 Notes 
recommended that tribunals “only suggest settlement negotiations with caution.” UNCITRAL, 
UNCITRAL NOTES ON ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS ¶ 46 (1996), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf. The Working 
Group’s decision to adopt a more favorable stance on settlement “reflect[s] more positively the 
possibility of amicable settlements during arbitral proceedings.” Esme Shirlow, UNCITRAL’s 
2016 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings: Evolutions and Fragmentations in 
International Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/09/07/uncitrals-2016-notes-on-organizing-arbitral-
proceedings-evolutions-and-fragmentations-in-international-arbitration/. Perspectives on 
settlement “had evolved to such an extent that—in some circumstances—it may even be 
appropriate for arbitrators to be involved in mediating such settlements themselves.” Id. 
67.  Neil Kaplan, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Change It, 80 ARB. 172, 172 (2014). 
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invites tribunals to fix a hearing after the first round of written 
submissions and before the hearing on the merits at which both 
counsel open their respective cases before the tribunal.68 One 
advantage of this Kaplan Opening is that by “[b]ringing the parties 
together, with their trial counsel, well in advance of the hearing  . . . 
there is a chance that at least part of the case may be settled, or points 
of disagreement minimized.”69 
Arbitrators have other tools to focus the parties on reasons for 
settling, including weaknesses or vulnerabilities of their case. Article 
2 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International 
Arbitration provides that the tribunal  “is encouraged to identify to the 
Parties, as soon as it considers it to be appropriate, any issues: (a) that the 
Arbitral Tribunal may regard as relevant to the case and material to its 
outcome; and/or (b) for which a preliminary determination may be 
appropriate.”70 The American Arbitration Association’s Code of Ethics 
for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes clarifies that arbitrators “may 
engage in discourse with the parties or their counsel, draw out 
arguments or contentions, comment on the law or evidence, make 
interim rulings, and otherwise control or direct the arbitration.”71 
Together with institutional rules designed to help identify key issues 
early in the proceedings,72 these provisions ensure that arbitrators can 
discuss the case with the parties. In so doing, the Tribunal can work to 
ensure “the mutual recognition of each party’s position,” and to 
facilitate “new analysis and new risk assessment by each party, which 
may well be the beginning of new efforts to have the case settled.”73 
But should arbitrators go further? Should they become involved 
in facilitating or even participating in settlement discussions, as many 
US judges do? Hybrid procedures—such as Med-Arb, in which 
                                                                                                             
68. Id. at 174. 
69. Id.  
70. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L ARB. art. 2(3) (INT’L BAR ASS’N 
2010). 
71. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 4 (AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N & AM. BAR ASS’N 2004), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/commercial_disputes.authchec
kdam.pdf (quoting Canon I to Rule 15).  
72. For example, the 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL rules was intended to ensure 
clarification of the core issues in dispute at an earlier stage in the proceedings. DAVID CARON 
& LEE CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, A COMMENTARY 371 (2d ed. 2013). 
73. Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator, 21 ARB. INT’L 
523, 531 (2005). 
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parties commence mediation with the understanding that, if the 
procedure fails, the dispute will go to arbitration, and arbitration-
mediation (“Arb-Med”), in which parties begin arbitral proceedings 
and then elect to attempt mediation—both anticipate the same person 
acting as both arbitrator and mediator.74 This dual role raises concerns 
about the ability of the arbitrator-mediator to remain impartial 
throughout the processes.75 The bias problem arises because “the role 
of mediator and arbitrator can be at odds with each other.”76 The 
mediator can, and must, caucus with the parties separately, creating 
the risk of bias if the mediator learns confidential information in the 
course of these ex-parte conversations77 or expresses provisional 
perspectives on the case.78  The ICC Mediation Rules address this 
concern, stating that “[u]nless all of the parties agree otherwise in 
writing, a Mediator shall not act nor shall have acted in any judicial, 
arbitral or similar proceedings relating to the dispute.”79  
Despite the advent of such procedures, many arbitrators remain 
reluctant to actively engage in settlement proceedings. As discussed 
above, the issue is sometimes one of culture. As Professor Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler writes, arbitrators from legal cultures where courts 
play a prominent role in promoting settlement—such as Germany, 
Switzerland, and China—tend to engage in settling disputes among 
the parties before them.80 Yet, as also noted above, US (and other 
common law) lawyers who serve as arbitrators rarely promote 
settlement among the parties appearing before them, notwithstanding 
the increased role played by US courts in doing precisely that over the 
past three decades.81 
                                                                                                             
74. Jacob Rosoff, Hybrid Efficiency in Arbitration: Waiving Potential Conflicts for Dual 
Role Arbitrators in Med-Arb and Arb-Med Proceedings, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 89, 89 (2009). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 89-90.  
77. Id. at 91. 
78. Alexis Mourre, The Proper Use of Med-Arb in the Resolution of International 
Disputes, 2016 ASIAN DISP. REV. 94, 94 (2016).  
79. MEDIATION RULES art. 10(3) (INT’L CHAMBER COM. 2014). 
80. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 195-97. See generally Kaufman-Kohler 
Bonnin, supra note 10. 
81. W. Whitaker Rayner, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 172 (1985); see also Klaus Peter Berger, The International 
Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure versus Home Jurisdiction—A German 
Perspective, 25 ARB. INT’L 217, 225 (2009) (“[C]ommon law arbitrators and counsel have 
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More broadly, proactive efforts by international arbitrators to 
facilitate settlement remain exceptional.82 That is unfortunate, as there 
are significant advantages to having the arbitrator involved in 
settlement discussions with the parties, as opposed to a mediator or 
other third person who is not involved in adjudicating the dispute. 
According to Professor Kaufmann-Kohler: 
First, the arbitrator already knows the case. A third party 
mediator or conciliator who acts before or in parallel to 
arbitration must acquire such knowledge, with the unavoidable 
duplication of work, additional expenses and delays. Second and 
foremost, the arbitrator is the master of the timing the 
proceedings, and is in the best position to choose the appropriate 
moment to offer the tribunal’s services for settlement purposes. 
This may often be after the exchange of written briefs and before 
the hearing. It may also be after a partial award. It should not be 
too early in the proceedings, when the arbitrators (and sometimes 
the parties as well) do not have a sufficient understanding of the 
issues. It should not be too late either; it should not be at a time 
when the parties have already spent too much time on the 
arbitration and may no longer be willing to settle. Identifying the 
right moment is a question of judgment, and experienced 
arbitrators will generally know when the time is ripe.83 
There are also significant risks or concerns when an arbitrator 
becomes involved in promoting settlement. The first is the risk posed 
to the consensual nature of arbitration. Neither party should feel 
coerced into settling the case or even into entering settlement 
discussions (with or without the arbitrator). Another risk is that a 
party may reveal facts to the arbitrator-mediator that are unknown to 
the other party during private caucuses, raising due process 
concerns.84 Still another risk is the threat to impartiality. The fear is 
that, if the settlement fails and the arbitration continues, the arbitrator 
                                                                                                             
always looked with skepticism and even some dismay at this pragmatic approach to settlement 
in arbitration.”). 
82. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Arbitrator’s Case Management: Experiences and 
Suggestions, in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE, AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT—LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 115, 124 (Gerald Aksen & 
Robert Briner eds., 2005).  
83. Kaufman-Kohler, supra note 8, at 197. 
84. Id. 
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will lose her impartiality and/or objectivity because of information 
learned during the course of settlement discussions.85 
There are rules and guidelines to help diminish, if not eliminate, 
these valid concerns. First, an arbitrator may only get involved in 
settlement discussions with the informed consent and express 
agreement of the parties. General Standard 4(d) of the IBA Guidelines 
on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration provides: 
An arbitrator may assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the 
dispute . . . at any stage of the proceedings. However, before 
doing so, the arbitrator should receive an express agreement by 
the parties that acting in such a manner shall not disqualify the 
arbitrator from continuing to serve as arbitrator. Such express 
agreement shall be considered to be an effective waiver of any 
conflict of interest that may arise from the arbitrator’s 
participation in such process or from information that the 
arbitrator may learn in the process. If the assistance by the 
arbitrator does not lead to final settlement of the case, the parties 
remain bound by their waiver.86 
Second, arbitrators are discouraged from meeting with the parties 
separately. The IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 
provide that arbitrators may make settlement proposals “to both 
parties simultaneously, preferably in the presence of each other.”87 
The IBA Rules state that it is “undesirable that any arbitrator discuss 
settlement terms with a party in the absence of the other,” since this 
could result in the disqualification of the arbitrator.88 Third, although 
the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest make clear that an 
arbitrator’s impartiality does not necessarily become impaired if she 
engages in settlement discussions with the parties, the arbitrator 
                                                                                                             
85. Id. 
86. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB. § 4(d) (INT’L BAR 
ASS’N 2014). 
87. IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INT’L ARBITRATORS § 8 (INT’L BAR ASS’N 1987); see 
also Kaufman-Kohler, supra note 8, at 199. 
88. IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INT’L ARBITRATORS, supra note 87, § 8. The concept of 
Med-Arb and Arb-Med, where the arbitrator also plays the role of mediator, may run into 
conflict with this Rule, given that mediators typically meet with the parties separately. See 
Rosoff, supra note 74, at 91. 
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should nonetheless resign if she considers that she cannot perform her 
duties as a result of her involvement in the settlement process.89 
The London-based Centre for Efficient Dispute Resolution 
(“CEDR”) launched its Rules for the Facilitation of Settlement in 
International Arbitration in 2009. In adopting these rules, parties 
agree that the arbitral tribunal’s facilitation of settlement will not be 
used as grounds to disqualify the tribunal or any member thereof, or 
to challenge any award rendered.90 The tribunal is prohibited from 
taking into account “any substantive matters discussed in settlement 
meetings or communications” or assessing the credibility of any 
witness based on the witness’ participation in settlement discussions 
when rendering an award.91 The tribunal is likewise prevented from 
ex parte meetings, or from acquiring information from one party 
which is not shared with the other.92 To facilitate settlement, the 
tribunal is vested with the authority to provide the parties with 
“preliminary views on the issues in dispute,” as well as “preliminary 
non-binding findings.”93 The tribunal “shall insert a Mediation 
Window in the arbitral proceedings when requested to do so by all 
Parties,” and must also “adjourn the arbitral proceedings for a 
specified period of time so as to enable mediation.”94 
In sum, in appropriate cases, arbitrators can and should 
encourage and facilitate settlement as an important tool in making 
international arbitration less expensive and more efficient. Arbitral 
institutions increasingly recognize the need to promote settlement in 
international arbitration. With the consent of the parties, arbitrators 
also have a role to play in promoting and facilitating settlement, but 
must be mindful of valid due process and impartiality concerns in 
playing this part. The task may not be easy, as arbitrators who have 
been involved in the parties’ settlement discussions should not take 
the matters discussed in settlement meetings or other communications 
into account if the case proceeds to the merits. But many US judges 
                                                                                                             
89. See generally IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB., supra 
note 86. 
90. CEDR RULES FOR THE FACILITATION OF SETTLEMENT IN INT'L ARB. art. 3(3) (CTR. 
EFFECTIVE DISP. RESOL. 2009). 
91. Id. art. 3(5). 
92. Id. art. 5(2). 
93. Id. art. 5(1). 
94. Id. art. 5(3). 
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are able to accomplish this task. Moreover, arbitrators must often put 
aside evidence and other information they have heard, but which they 
later determine to be irrelevant, in deciding the merits of a case. By 
following appropriate steps, such as ensuring the written agreement of 
parties and avoiding ex parte communications, arbitrators can fairly 
promote settlement and help improve the efficiency and efficacy so 
vital to international arbitration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite a growing awareness that promoting settlement may 
help reduce costs and inefficiencies in international arbitral 
proceedings, arbitrations settle at much lower rates than proceedings 
in US courts. In part, this disparity may be attributed to the assertive 
case management approach embraced by US judges, who actively 
encourage settlement as a mechanism to address ever-growing 
dockets. In contrast, many arbitrators remain timid about promoting 
settlement—and are unlikely to be involved in settlement or 
mediation efforts. Such reluctance stems, in part, from fears that 
participation in settlement risks the arbitrator’s neutrality or raises due 
process concerns. But these concerns can be addressed by following 
guidelines and rules designed to preserve arbitral neutrality and 
procedural fairness while helping parties reach an amicable 
settlement. With the consent of the parties, arbitrators should use 
these tools in order to achieve fair, efficient, and cost-effective 
resolution of disputes. There are good and understandable reasons 
why the settlement rate in international arbitration is and will almost 
certainly remain lower than that of US litigation. But the notion that 
international arbitrators should never promote or involve themselves 
in settlement discussions among the parties is neither sound nor 
sustainable. 
 
 
